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I. Introduction
Measures to cope with a financial crisis differ depending on whether they are
taken ex ante or ex post. From an ex ante perspective, the important point is to
minimize the possibility of a financial crisis. From the ex post perspective,
however, which must deal with a financial crisis after it has occurred, the
important point is how to stabilize and revitalize the financial system. There is
a certain relationship between ex ante and ex post. Measures taken at a certain
point in time to counter a financial crisis could affect the possibility of another
crisis in the future. Thus, when considering ex post measures, it is advisable to
maintain an ex ante perspective as well.
This and the following chapters will deal with the ex post question of how
to cope with a financial crisis. We do not take up the question of why the Asian
financial crisis occurred or how it could have been prevented. Instead we
focus on the countermeasures that were put in place after the financial crisis
had already occurred.
This chapter will not analyze any specific model. Rather it will summarize
the main points that will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6. It will also review
the problem of corporate debt restructuring by examining the policy adopted
after the onset of the Asian currency crisis. The paper will then try to show that
an improvement in corporate governance, which is often stressed from the ex
ante standpoint, is also meaningful in the ex post context.
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Bank restructuring, which together with corporate debt restructuring has
been an important ex post measure against the financial crisis, will be dis-
cussed in Chapter 5. The chapter will review the relationship between bank
bailout measures and moral hazard in bank management by using the theory
of time inconsistency, which shows the complex relationship between ex ante
and ex post. Based on this review, the chapter will examine which specific
measures have been adequate for bailing out banks.
One effect of the deteriorated corporate finance, which is briefly touched on
in this chapter, has been an increase in the agency cost of external fund-
raising. Model analysis of this agency cost and its policy implications will be
discussed in detail in Chapter 6.
A currency crisis is essentially different from a financial crisis. However,
many countries hit by the Asian currency crisis also suffered, albeit to varying
degrees, from Asia’s financial crisis. As has been pointed out in Chapter 3, the
financial crisis dealt a heavier blow to Asian economies that have a bank-
based financial system.
The blow of the currency crisis and financial crisis on economic growth was
enormous. Nevertheless, renewed economic growth in these countries indi-
cates that they emerged from the currency crisis in one to two years, though at
varying speeds (Table 4-1). In 1999, two years after the crisis, economic
growth rates turned positive in most of these countries, with the Republic of
Korea’s economy posting a higher growth rate than before the crisis.
However, the financial crisis left behind a lot of problems. In terms of the
soundness of their management and the size of their nonperforming loans,
TABLE  4-1
GROWTH RATES OF ASIAN ECONOMIES
(%)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Hong Kong 3.9 4.5 5.0 −5.3 3.0 10.5 0.1
Indonesia 8.2 7.8 4.7 −13.1 0.8 4.9 3.3
Korea, Republic of 8.9 6.7 5.0 −6.7 10.9 9.3 3.0
Malaysia 9.8 10.0 7.3 −7.4 6.1 8.3 0.4
The Philippines 4.7 5.8 5.2 −0.6 3.4 4.4 3.2
Singapore 8.0 7.7 8.5 −0.1 6.9 10.3 −2.0
Taiwan 6.4 6.1 6.7 4.6 5.4 5.9 −1.9
Thailand 8.9 5.9 −1.4 −10.5 4.4 4.6 1.8
China 10.5 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.3
Vietnam 9.5 9.3 8.2 5.8 4.8 6.8 N.A.
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators of Developing Asian and Pacific Coun-
tries, various issues.
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financial institutions are still reeling from the lingering aftereffects of the
crisis. Tables 4-2 and 4-3 show the post-crisis situation in 1998 and 1999. The
1999 figures indicate that nonperforming loans held by Korean financial insti-
tutions accounted for about 19% of their total loans, or approximately 27% of
the country’s GDP. These two ratios were respectively 20% and 30% in
Malaysia, 45% and 60% in Thailand, and over 50% and 25% in Indonesia.1
Malaysia managed to avoid an explicit financial crisis, but nevertheless faced
the problem of nonperforming loans.
The speed of recovery in the health of financial institutions and the disposal
of nonperforming loans (or corporate debt restructuring and financial restruc-
turing) differed greatly from country to country, depending on what measures
were taken. Therefore judging which ex post measures were better for coping
with the financial crisis is very crucial.
TABLE  4-2
RATIO OF NONPERFORMING LOANS TO TOTAL LOANS, DECEMBER 1998–SEPTEMBER 1999
(%)
Malaysia Korea, Republic of Thailand
Dec. 1998 Jun. 1999 Dec. 1998 Jun. 1999 Dec. 1998 Jun. 1999
Commercial banks 13.0 12.8 7.4 8.7 42.9 44.6
Merchant banks 30.6 31.6 20.0 11.9
Other financial
institutions 26.8 23.9 13.1 14.5 70.2 62.3
Asset management
companies 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total financial system 19.7 21.2 16.8 19.2 45.0 45.3
Source: World Bank, Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2000,
1999, Table 3.2.
TABLE  4-3
RATIO OF NONPERFORMING LOANS, INDONESIA
(%)
Mar. 1996 Mar. 1997 Mar. 1998 Mar. 1999
All commercial banks 10.6 9.3 19.8 58.7
State-run banks 16.6 14.2 24.2 47.5
Private foreign exchange banks 4.0 4.4 12.8 76.9
Private non-foreign exchange banks 14.7 16.5 19.9 38.9
Local development banks 18.5 13.9 15.8 17.0
Joint-venture banks 7.4 7.7 25.3 64.6
Foreign banks 2.8 2.7 24.4 49.9
Source: Takeda (2000).
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A major reason for the gravity of the financial crises that occurred in the
wake of the Asian currency crisis was the fact that many financial institutions
and business corporations relied on funds raised from overseas sources. In
effect, many of their loans were denominated in foreign currencies. As ex-
change rates declined in the wake of the currency crisis, the burden of their
loans increased. This means that the drop in currency value by more than half
at the peak of the crisis more than doubled the amount of their debt burden. In
Indonesia alone, the currency dropped to one-sixth its pre-crisis value, result-
ing in a six-fold expansion of its debts (Tables 4-4 and 4-5). With this magni-
tude of debt, an ordinary financial institution or business corporation cannot
stave off bankruptcy.
Financial institutions’ direct borrowing from overseas initially triggered the
financial crisis while corporate direct borrowing from overseas drove compa-
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
TABLE  4-4
EXCHANGE RATE CHANGES DURING THE ASIAN CURRENCY CRISIS
Country Currency Jan. 1990 Jun. 1997 Jan. 1998 Jul. 1998 Dec. 1999
Indonesia Rupia 1,804.85 2,446.59 9,662.50 13,962.50 7,156.00
Thailand Baht 25.73 25.78 53.81 41.19 38.18
The Philippines Peso 22.46 26.38 42.66 41.78 40.62
Malaysia Ringgit 2.70 2.52 4.41 4.16 3.80
Korea, Republic of Won 683.43 889.49 1,701.53 1,293.73 1,137.09
(Ref.) Japan Yen 145.09 114.21 129.45 140.73 102.68
Just before Worst time Worst time
Remarks the currency  (excl. (excl.
crisis Indonesia)  Indonesia)
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
Note: All figures denote average monthly rates.
TABLE  4-5
CHANGES IN CURRENCY STRENGTH
(%)
Country Jan. 1990 Jun. 1997 Jan. 1998 Jul. 1998 Dec. 1999
Indonesia 136 100 25 18 34
Thailand 100 100 48  63  68
The Philippines 117 100 62  63 65
Malaysia 93 100 57 61 66
Korea, Republic of 130 100 52 69 78
(Ref.) Japan 79 100 88 81 111
Source: Prepared by the author based on Table 4-4.
Note: Base date = June 1997.
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nies into bankruptcy. Financial institutions which had extended loans to such
companies found themselves burdened with a growing volume of
nonperforming loans. Such nonperforming loans lowered the profits of financial
institutions, creating another factor for the financial crisis. All this is illus-
trated in Figure 4-1.
In the ex ante context, the problems dealt with concern such questions as:
how foreign-currency-denominated loans to banks and companies increased
before the crisis, what factors caused the currency crisis, or what measures
should have been taken to prevent the crises (see the left side of Figure 4-2).
These questions have received a great deal of discussion, and still remain
largely unresolved (Kunimune 1999b, 2001a; Kunimune 1998b, 2000e).
In the ex post context, on the other hand, the problems of concern are such
questions as: what impact corporate balance sheet (B/S) losses and bank B/S
losses have on the economy, or what measures should be taken to overcome
these problems (see the right side of Figure 4-2).
Fig. 4-1. Relationship between Asian Currency Crisis and Financial Crisis
Note: B/S = balance sheet.
Financial
CrisisForeign-currency-denominated
loans by companies and banks
Lower exchange rates
(Currency Crisis)
Bank nonperforming loans
Damage to corporate B/S
Damage to bank B/S

Fig. 4-2. Two Perspectives: Ex Ante and Ex Post
Financial
CrisisForeign-currency-denominated
loans by companies and banks
Lower exchange rates
(Currency Crisis)
Bank nonperforming loans
Damage to corporate B/S
Damage to bank B/S

Ex ante
perspective
Ex post
perspective
What caused?
How to prevent?
Why are they problems?
How to cope with them?
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As was stated above, this and the following chapters deal with the ex post
problems, as illustrated in the right half of the Figure 4-2. Section II below
will review the issue of company B/S losses and the problem of distorted
corporate behavior (the lowest box on the right side of Figure 4-2). Chapter 5
will examine the advisability of government bank bailout measures (the high-
est box on the right side of Figure 4-2), which is one of the issues related to
bank B/S losses.
II. Countering Distorted Corporate Behavior Caused by Deterio-
rating Finances
From the corporate standpoint, nonperforming loans mean a deteriorating
corporate B/S. But why does a problem occur when there is a B/S loss?
Basically, B/S deterioration reflects only the failure of past corporate behav-
ior. The question is whether it will affect future corporate behavior. If it is
found to have no impact on future behavior, then the solution of the
nonperforming loan problem is basically a matter of redistributing income.
However, if the worsening B/S is found to have an adverse impact on future
corporate behavior, solving the nonperforming loan problem becomes difficult.
In this situation, the difference between measures that deal with the problem
promptly or policies that put off solutions will have a grave impact on the
future of the economy.
In sum, a worsening B/S does adversely affect corporate investment deci-
sions. Reasons for this will be discussed in the following sections.
A. Debt Overhang
The phenomenon of “debt overhang” can be explained with a simple illus-
tration. Suppose that a company is about to make an investment decision
based on an expected profit of V and an investment cost of I. To simplify the
story, assume that the company’s initial assets are zero.
The criterion for making new investment decisions is whether the value of
V − I is positive. As V − I shows net profit expected from investment, the
company carries out investment as long as it is positive. This of course is
desirable from the social standpoint as well.
However, the criterion for investment decisions changes, even for a com-
pany with the same investment opportunity, if the company has to repay the
principal and interest on its debt (P). (As the company is regarded as having
no assets at the outset, it has negative net worth. However, since the repayment
is not due yet, the company can be regarded as not having fallen into default.)
68 CHAPTER 4
The criterion for investment decisions this time is whether V − I − P is
positive or not. Compared with the previous case, the existence of debt makes
the criterion more difficult. If the value of V − I is within the range of
P > V − I > 0, companies free of debt service will decide to make new invest-
ments, while those with debt obligations will not. Even in the latter case, the
expected net profit from new investment would be positive. That no invest-
ment is made means a loss of social welfare. This phenomenon is called debt
overhang (Myers 1997).
B. Asset Substitution
Turning next to the phenomenon of “asset substitution,” generally, debtors
who have limited liability tend toward more risky behavior than others. As-
suming that the corporate value V is a random variable, its probability distri-
bution can be changed by corporate management behavior d (management is
supposed to be “risk neutral”).
Here, two cases will be considered. One is when the company has no debt.
The other is when the company is facing debt service worth P.
When the company has no debt, corporate management behavior would be:
d
(i) max E(V).
When the company has debt, the behavior would be:
d
(ii) max E(MAX[V − P, 0]).
The solution of maximization problem generally differs for these two cases.
However, when V exceeds P at probability 1 (the lowest limit of the value
d
range of random variable V is larger than P), (ii) becomes max E(V − P), and
its solutionbecomes the same as in (i), because P is constant. When the
possibility of the company falling into default is zero, the existence of debt
would not cause any distortion in corporate management behavior. By con-
trast, when the probability of V exceeding P is low (or when the possibility of
the company falling into default is high), the existence of debt is likely to
cause distort corporate behavior.
The only concern for management is that V exceeds P. When V falls short of
P, an inevitable default follows which can drive the company into bankruptcy,
but the management is indifferent to how far the company is in deficit. This
can induce highly risky investment behavior which bets on hefty profits for
succeed, but huge loss for failure.
The existence of this induced behavior is one of the central issues in the
agency problem between borrower and creditor. When the existence of debt
drives corporate management to assume more risk than otherwise, substitut-
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ing safer investments or assets for riskier ones, it is called asset substitution.
C. Agency Cost and Corporate Investment
The foregoing section briefly touched on the agency problem between
borrower and creditor, pointing to the possibility that the existence of debt can
prompt a debtor into highly risky investment behavior (which represents a sort
of moral hazard). What is called agency cost is the sum of (1) economic loss
caused by the agent’s (debtor’s) insincere behavior to the principal (creditor),
and (2) the cost needed to prevent such insincere behavior of the agent.
Because a company’s worsened financial position aggravates the agency
problem with its creditors and increases agency cost, the company has to offer
a higher interest rate when it wants to borrow. Thus the increased cost of
raising funds because of the company’s worsened B/S adversely affects its
investment behavior.
Moreover, should the company suffer a business failure, a different sort of
agency problem can arise between the creditor and debtor over how to cope
with the failure or bankruptcy? This is also included in the agency cost in-
volved in the company’s debt. However, as bankruptcy does not always occur,
the cost for probable bankruptcy should be discounted.
The existence of such agency cost is likely to increase the cost of raising
funds. This is because potential lenders will not lend money without a sur-
charge for the expected agency cost added onto the market interest rates.2
Now suppose that two companies have the same managerial conditions but
are in a different financial situation. One has good finances while the other is
in a worsened financial situation. The former, with smaller agency and fund-
raising costs, is likely to be more active in making new investments. The latter
is likely to be reluctant to make such investments. The difference in financial
conditions alone can thus influence corporate behavior.
At the time of the Asian currency crisis, many companies that had loans in
foreign currencies suddenly suffered deteriorated financial conditions due to
the drop in exchange rates. From the standpoint of agency cost, this increased
the cost of fund-raising and eroded new investment. In effect there was finan-
cial deterioration across the board, leading to a decrease in investment through-
out the economy. This caused a downward economic cycle.
D. Countermeasures
1. Prompt and Efficient Handling of Bankruptcies
Since B/S deterioration has an adverse effect on corporate behavior, as
stated in the preceding sections, it is very important to take as prompt and
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efficient measures as possible to correct this problem. If the deterioration is
enough to cause a company to default on its debt payments, the country’s
institutional procedures for handling bankruptcies will come into play.
In developing countries the financial legal systems have remained much in
need of improvement, and they often had to start with the enactment of
bankruptcy laws. It was only after the currency crisis that a new bankruptcy
law was introduced in Indonesia and Thailand. This is an elementary step for
any legal system, and the establishment of such laws is very important in the
developing countries. In this endeavor, these countries can refer to the legal
codes adopted in the developed countries. However, while referring to the
advanced legal system, it may be necessary to modify it to suit the countries’
own conditions.
Bankruptcies must be dealt with not only promptly but also efficiently,
meaning that an appropriate decision must be made whether to liquidate the
company or allow it to survive. This decision will depend on the importance
given to the company’s liquidation value (the value to be gained by selling the
residual assets) or its going-concern value (the discounted present value of the
future operating cash flow to be gained through survival).3
To improve the handling of bankruptcies, not only do bankruptcy and other
relative laws need to be enacted but the judicial system and the education and
training of judicial personnel also have to be improved.
2. Mediation of Corporate Debt Negotiations
There are both legal and private methods for dealing with bankruptcy.
Large-scale bankruptcies with many interested people involved sometimes
cannot be settled without resorting to legal procedures. Conversely, small-
scale cases involving few interested people can effectively be handled pri-
vately. When the possibility of rehabilitating the company is high, voluntary
consensus among the interested parties is easier to reach and private methods
are more advisable.
However, it is only the rules of public (legal) negotiations that government
policy can control directly. The government is not in a position to set the rules
for private negotiations. Nevertheless, established legislation does have an
indirect impact on private negotiations. The reason is that when a court deci-
sion is more or less predictable, the predicted judgment would serve as the
starting point for private negotiations. As such, it will reduce the cost of
negotiations. Well-established public legislation can thus be expected to have
a positive impact on private negotiations.
In some Asian countries after the currency crisis, their governments set up
special organizations and adopted policies for these organizations to act as
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intermediaries in promoting private debt negotiations. However, as will be
discussed in the next section regarding nonperforming loan settlement, gov-
ernments should involve themselves in private debt negotiations only excep-
tionally as an ex post measure for countering a large-scale financial crisis.
If such intermediation can really reduce the costs in private debt negotia-
tions, it would be an efficient policy. However, it is difficult to measure the
effect of the policy, and therefore difficult to judge its efficiency. For instance,
Thailand set up the Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee
(CDRAC) which intermediated many negotiations on corporate debt. This
helped lower the ratio of bank nonperforming loans to a certain extent. How-
ever, because the government was not involved in ascertaining whether corpo-
rate rehabilitation plans were actually implemented, many problems occurred,
including cases of default, after negotiated agreements had been concluded.
As Thailand lagged behind other countries in bank restructuring, this might
have distorted the incentives for banks to play a leading role in corporate
restructuring. Since banks with deteriorated financial positions might not
have wanted to face their bad-loan problems squarely and covered them up,
this probably led to putting off the problems rather than really restructuring
indebted companies.
The Thai government also allowed financial institutions to exclude success-
fully renegotiated loans from the category of nonperforming loans on their
books. Combined with the distorted incentives of banks, the policy ended up
being a cover for putting off the real solution to the bad-loans problem. Both
sides in negotiations were inclined to reach agreement even when the feasibil-
ity of company rehabilitation was doubtful. It is advisable, therefore, to cor-
rect bank behavior by immediately implementing bank restructuring first, and
then proceed with the promotion of private debt negotiations.
Other examples of such mediation efforts include the Corporate Debt Re-
structuring Committee (CDRC) in Malaysia and the Indonesian government’s
arbitration committee called the Jakarta Initiative. In Korea a syndicate of
lending banks, which was established under the strong government promo-
tion, is presently engaged in private debt negotiations.
3. Intensive Government Intervention for Disposing Nonperforming Loans
Under ordinary economic conditions, a government would never consider
buying up nonperforming loans more directly and negotiating with creditors
on behalf of the debtors. But this exceptional approach can be resorted to
when the government judged that the problem is too large for the private
sector alone to handle.
In some Asian countries in the aftermath of the currency crisis, the
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nonperforming loans held by the financial sector expanded to such a huge
amount that the government began to examine the intensive handling of these
loans. In Indonesia, Korea, and Malaysia, a large portion of nonperforming
loans was transferred to the asset management company established by each
government, as shown in Table 4-6.
Of course, such purchasing should be made at adequate (estimated) market
prices, rather than at book value, otherwise it would be tantamount to giving
the creditor a needless subsidy. Nevertheless it is difficult to evaluate this sort
of government intervention because it has both positive and negative points.
One problem is asymmetric information. The government’s information
about the debtor is likely to be less than that held by the creditor. If so, the
creditor is in a better position than the government in dealing with the debtor.
On the positive side, direct involvement enables the government to put
pressure on ill-intentioned debtors in cooperation with the police and court.
Here the government has greater leverage than do private-sector creditors.
Secondly, when the healthy management of banks is spoiled by a financial
crisis, it is possible that these banks may fail to deal properly with
nonperforming loans. When the behavior of management becomes distorted,
banks are greatly inclined to put off the disposal of their nonperforming loans.
Thirdly, the number of creditors can be reduced. If the government can
acquire the debts of from all the creditors, it would become the only creditor,
helping to resolve the conflicting interests of the creditors.
A compromise plan can also be followed whereby a credit collection orga-
nization established by the government can buy up badly deteriorated portions
of nonperforming loans (unrecoverable loans, for example), while the other
better loans can be left for banks to handle. The badly deteriorated
nonperforming loans are those that banks have failed to manage adequately.
Their removal from bank B/S would not cause a great loss in their value. For
the management of nonperforming loans that are not significantly deterio-
TABLE  4-6
NONPERFORMING LOANS TRANSFERRED TO ASSET MANAGEMENT COMPANIES
(%)
Indonesia Korea, Malaysia ThailandRepublic of
Ratio of nonperforming loans transferred 60.5 43.6 27.1 6.3
to AMCs (all financial institutions)
Month of computation Sep. 1999 Sep. 1999 Dec. 1999 Dec. 1999
Source: Computed by the author from the World Bank, East Asia: Recovery and Be-
yond (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), Table 4.3.
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rated, information held by banks on individual debtors is helpful. Non-
performing loans were acquired in this way in Indonesia. As shown in Table
4-7, however, Asian government strategies for buying up nonperforming loans
differs noticeably from country to country.
4. Improving in Bankruptcy Resolution and Corporate Governance and
Reducing Agency Cost
While legal reform in the resolution of bankruptcies, as discussed above, is
useful as a direct measure against the distorted behavior of companies on the
verge of bankruptcy, it also acts to reduce agency cost. This is because the
agency cost for issuing debt includes the cost of the agency problem arising
from the occurrence of bankruptcies. An improvement in the handling of
bankruptcies indirectly helps lower debt-issue costs by reducing the costs
incurred in case of bankruptcy. In this way, the improvement can also mitigate
the problems of companies that do not fail but face higher fund-raising costs
caused by high agency costs.
Another factor for reducing agency cost is the introduction of measures to
improve corporate governance, including stricter accounting standards and
stronger demand for the disclosure of information on listed companies. Dis-
cussions about corporate governance were originally directed at disciplining
corporate management on the basis of the principal-agency relationship be-
Source: Excerpted from the World Bank, East Asia: Recovery and Beyond (Washing-
ton, D.C.: World Bank, 2000), Table 4.5.
TABLE  4-7
METHODS FOR TRANSFERRING NONPERFORMING LOANS TO THE GOVERNMENT-ESTABLISHED
ASSET MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONS
Indonesia Korea, Rep. of Malaysia Thailand
Assets were initially
purchased above
market-clearing
prices with recourse.
Since Feb. 1998
efforts have been
made to purchase at
market prices.
No particular
strategy
Purchased assets
are valued by
independent
outside auditors.
Loans larger than
5 million ringgits,
and mostly loans
secured by prop-
erty or shares
The government
initially set up no
asset management
corporation. (Set
up in July 2001.)
Is the buying price
beneficial to the
bank?
Type of assets
transferred
No
Worst
assets
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tween corporate managers and fund suppliers such as creditors or sharehold-
ers. An improvement in corporate governance should consequently have a
direct impact on agency cost.
The issue of corporate governance is often discussed from the ex ante
perspective and is aimed at maintaining good corporate governance so as not
to weaken the financial system and prevent a financial crisis. What we have
pointed out in this chapter is that an improvement in corporate governance is
also significant as an ex post measure for overcoming Asia’s financial crisis.
III. Conclusion
This chapter dealt with the Asian financial crisis from the ex post perspective
of how to cope with the crisis after it occurred. The chapter summarized
points of discussions as an introduction to Chapters 5 and 6, and reviewed the
problem of corporate debt restructuring in the aftermath of the Asian currency
crisis. The chapter cited debt overhang, asset substitution, and dwindling
investment due to higher agency cost as problematic behavior of companies
with deteriorated financial balance sheets. As a means for countering such
behavior, the chapter discussed such steps as prompt and efficient handling of
bankruptcies, promotion of private debt negotiations, the government’s dis-
posal of nonperforming loans, and an improvement in corporate governance.
Chapter 5 will deal with the issue of bank restructuring which, along with
corporate debt restructuring, is an important ex post measure for overcoming
the financial crisis. The chapter will review the relationship between bailout
measures for banks and moral hazard in bank management, using the concept
of time inconsistency to show the complex relationship between ex ante and
ex post measures. Based on this discussion, the chapter will examine what
measures are adequate for bailing out banks.
Chapter 6 will analyze a theoretical model and the policy implications of
increased agency costs resulting from external fund raising, which were pointed
out in the present chapter as one of the effects of deteriorated corporate
financial conditions.
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Notes
This chapter, together with Chapter 5, has been revised based on Kunimune (2001b).
1 The Indonesian figures show only bank nonperforming loans.
2 Here, the agency cost related to the creditor-debtor relationship is explained, but
another type of agency cost arises when funds are raised through stocks.
3 However, when there are numerous creditors with claims of varying nature, some
of them will be preferred and other subordinated, or some will have their claims
secured and others will be unsecured. Therefore it is possible that their collective
decisions will not reflect a correct evaluation of the company’s going-concern
value or its liquidation value. For details, see Hart (1985) and Ikeo and Seshimo
(1999).
